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THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT:
THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL,
by James Q. Whitman 1
HAMZAS. DAWOOD
TO BE CONVICTED OF A CRIME in the common law world, an accused person
must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Because proving facts beyond a
reasonable doubt under strict rules of evidence can be very difficult, the reason-
able doubt standard is widely celebrated today as providing protection to the
accused from false conviction. Fascinatingly, in spite of the reasonable doubt
standard's centrality to the common law, significant uncertainty remains among
lawyers, judges, scholars, and jurors as to what reasonable doubt actually means.
In The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, James Q. Whitman strives to account for
the ambiguity which surrounds the reasonable doubt rule. Drawing heavily on
persuasive theological and historical evidence, Whitman ultimately demonstrates
that much of the confusion regarding what constitutes reasonable doubt is attrib-
utable to the fact that the rule originated in Medieval Christian Theology and
has, over many hundreds of years, been clumsily converted into secular, criminal
law. For Whitman, this process of conversion has resulted in society losing sight
of the original purpose of 'reasonable doubt" and has signally contributed to
modern confusion as to what the-concept means.
According to Whitman, confusion over what constitutes reasonable doubt
has given rise to a morally troubling reality in common law societies: criminally
accused persons are often sent to prison, or even death, based on an evidentiary
rule that essentially nobody understands. Whitman contends that this disquiet-
ing situation has arisen because the reasonable doubt rule is used to guide factual
proof inquiries in modern criminal proceedings, even though it was never origi-
nally intended to serve this purpose. Drawing on an impressive variety of primary
1. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 288 pages.
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sources, from the tracts of Early Church Fathers to the writings of medieval
English jurists, Whitman convincingly argues that the reasonable doubt rule
was originally designed for the benefit of jurors, rather than criminally accused
persons. Whitman details how the doctrine was initially developed to provide
moral comfort to medieval jurors, who doubted their moral authority to judge
others and hesitated toconvict accused persons because early Christian theology
dictated that they would incur eternal damnation if they found an innocent
person guilty. As Whitman puts it, the reasonable doubt doctrine ultimately
arose in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a response to the
"religiously motivated reluctance to convict" that prevailed in the premodern
world,2 and it sought to make conviction easier-not harder-by assuring ju-
rors that they could convict without fear of perdition as long as any doubts they
had about an accused person's guilt were not reasonable. In view of the reason-
able doubt rule's medieval origins as a reliable source of moral comfort rather
than factual proof, Whitman argues, it is not surprising that the doctrine causes
so much vexation today, as judges and juries try to use the rule to guide their
factual inquiries in criminal trials.
In the end, Whitman contends that, although calls for radical reform of
common law criminal procedure have considerable merit because of the reason-
able doubt doctrine's frailties in assisting the search for truth at trial, such sug-
gestions for reform are unrealistic, given the common law's deep conservatism
and attachment to tradition. For Whitman, the biggest reform lesson that we,
as a society, can learn from the history of the reasonable doubt rule is that we
should be more like the medieval jurors for whom the rule was originally de-
signed-we must approach the task of criminal judgment with a sober sense of
fear, humility, and public duty, always being cognizant of the doubts surround-
ing our own moral authority to judge.
2. Ibid. at 4 .
